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Abstract The authors present a case in which a physical
anomaly with an infusion pump resulted in an unforeseen
fault that the nurse’s attempts to resolve unknowingly
exacerbated. This case study presents the first report in the
literature to detail the difficulty in recreating a patient safety
event using smart pump logs, support server continuous
quality improvement (CQI) data, and the drug order entry
system to elucidate the clinical scenario. A 75-year-old
male patient presented to a major teaching hospital and was
admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) with a massive
gastrointestinal bleed and myocardial infarction, then sta-
bilized. One of the patient’s pumps alarmed ‘‘communica-
tion error’’ on the display. The display gave no explicit
instructions about how to resolve the issue, and resolution
was not intuitive. Attempts to clear the alarm failed, so the
module was disconnected to reprogram the infusion, caus-
ing an interruption in the dopamine. Over the course of
approximately 2 min of troubleshooting, the patient’s blood
pressure decreased from 109/50 to 60/30, with a rapid pulse
change from a consistent 95 up to 115 and subsequently 135
beats per minute. A cardiac arrest ensued and a code blue
was called. All cardiac drugs, including the dopamine, were
suspended during the code. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation
was performed and the patient survived the code. Post-code,
the dopamine and epinephrine were restarted, and the
norepinephrine was discontinued. The patient’s condition
remained very unstable. Pump logs and the server database
were queried to locate relevant equipment. It was concluded
that dirty contacts on the inter-unit interface (IUI) connec-
tors between the PC unit (PCU) and the modules caused the
alarm message ‘‘communication error’’ to appear on the
PCU display. Learning yielded a nursing practice alert to
clarify how a nurse should resolve a ‘‘communication
error’’, and appropriate cleaning protocols were promptly
implemented. The investigation found smart pump event
logs and proprietary software are not designed with any
forethought as to retrospective reconstruction of incident
investigations, leaving facilities to cobble together pieces of
information from multiple sources to determine what
occurred. The authors also suggest further pump enhance-
ments, challenging pump manufacturers to go to the next
level of integration and enable greater patient safety with
smart infusion pumps.
Key Points
‘‘Communication error’’ resulting in the removal of
the dopamine infusion module caused cessation in
therapy, resulting in a decrease in the patient’s blood
pressure.
Smart pump event logs and vendor software are not
designed with any forethought as to retrospective
reconstruction of patient safety events.
Infusion pump channels or multiple infusion pumps
providing therapy to the same patient do not
communicate as a patient-focused system.
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Introduction
Serious errors programming infusion pumps have been
documented in the literature [1–3]. Healthcare institutions
have used rigorous human factor assessments to acquire
smart pumps with drug error reduction software (DERS) to
mitigate programming errors at the bedside [4]. These
evaluations focus primarily on routine task workflow with
the pump rather than how the pump helps the user respond
during emergent fault conditions or the utility of the system
in reconstructing safety events. Retrospective analysis of
smart pump data is often conducted for professional prac-
tice improvements, to determine whether DERS safety
parameters are accurate, to identify chronic offending
drugs, or to determine the time of day when most errors
occur [5–8]. Infusion pump physical anomalies resulting in
adverse events have been described but remain relatively
rare [9]. A previous study has described the inconvenience
of using infusion pump logs to glean meaningful infor-
mation from common alarms such as air-in-line, door-
open, and battery use [10]. Infusion pump logs have also
been compared to ‘‘black boxes’’ in commercial aviation,
and the authors concluded that infusion logs are poorly
suited to accident investigations [11]. The authors present a
case in which a physical anomaly with the infusion pump
resulted in an unforeseen fault condition that was
unknowingly exacerbated by the nurse’s response and
attempts to resolve the issue. The pump discussed in this
case study is a modular Alaris System smart infusion
pump, firmware version 9.5.32.2 (CareFusion Corporation,
San Diego, CA, USA) with one central PC unit (PCU) and
up to four large-volume pump modules to accommodate
each drug infusion.
Case Report
A 75-year-old male patient presented to a major teaching
hospital on 8 July 2013 with a massive gastrointestinal
bleed (hemoglobin 50 g/l) and a myocardial infarction
(MI). The patient was known and had been diagnosed
previously with coronary artery disease and a non-ST
segment elevation MI (non-STEMI) in February 2013. The
patient was admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU), and
his condition was stabilized with a series of drugs (see
Table 1). On 12 July 2013 at approximately 1335 h, the
infusion pump module providing dopamine alarmed with a
‘‘communication error’’ message. The nurse was unfamiliar
with this error message and attempted to clear the alarm
but was unsuccessful. She turned the pump off and on
again, and received the same error message. Unsure of how
to respond, she disconnected the pump module, causing an
interruption in the dopamine infusion only, and promptly
reconnected and reprogrammed it. Over the course of
approximately 2 min of troubleshooting, the patient’s blood
pressure decreased from 109/50 to 60/30, with a rapid pulse
change from a consistent 95 up to 115 and subsequently
135 beats per minute. A cardiac arrest ensued and a code
blue was called at 1340 h. All cardiac drugs, including the
dopamine, were suspended during the code. Cardiopul-
monary resuscitation was performed and the patient sur-
vived the code. At 1343 h, the dopamine, and epinephrine
were restarted and the norepinephrine was discontinued.
The patient’s condition remained very unstable.
Following the event, the pump was quarantined and sent
to Biomedical Engineering (BME) for analysis.
Data Extraction and Investigation
Infusion pump events are stored in on-board memory
called logs. Some event information is also sent wirelessly
to the support server as continuous quality improvement
(CQI) data. The onboard Error Log contains a record of
any abnormal device conditions due to hardware or soft-
ware errors [12]. The onboard Event Log contains a com-
plete record of operating events, such as keystrokes,
alarms, external communications, and infusion start and
stops on the PCU and any connected modules. This log can
contain information in coded form about changes that
occurred on the display screen and other internal software
events [12]. The Continuous Quality Improvement Log
captures only the exceptions to the drug library during
Table 1 List of patient
medications from nursing notes
Drug Lumen Drug Rate
1 Proximal Morphine 1 mg/h
2 Proximal Midazolam 8 mg/h
3 Proximal Dopamine 20 lg/kg/min
4 Proximal Norepinephrine 1 lg/min
5 Medial Insulin 2.5 units/h
6 Medial Normal saline flush 10 ml/h (paired with insulin)
7 Distal Normal saline flush 15 ml/h (for medications, e.g. antibiotics)
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programming (e.g., exceeding a hard limit) and is stored on
the support server. An exception is defined as a drug library
selection by the pump user that contravenes a predefined
safety parameter, such as attempting to exceed a prede-
termined flow rate for a given concentration of drug [13].
Data log files are manually extracted from the PCU
using a serial to universal serial bus (USB) connection
cable between the RJ45 jack on the back of the pump and a
USB port on a computer running the proprietary software.
The support server is accessed via a web browser and the
pertinent information extracted into spreadsheets.
The investigation began with only the PCU and module
that were involved with the ‘‘communication error’’. It was
subsequently discovered that additional pumps and mod-
ules were involved with this patient’s care that had not
been quarantined for investigation and remained in the
hospital circulation. To find the equipment, the CQI server
database was queried using the patient’s medical record
number (MRN) and the date to determine the serial num-
bers of the additional PCUs and their adjunct modules.
Although the MRN is not required to operate the pump, it
was fortuitous that the clinician had entered the MRN
before commencing the infusion, as the MRN was the key
that unlocked the total number of PCUs and modules
providing therapy to the patient at the time of the adverse
event. It was discovered that a total combination of three
PCUs and nine modules were connected to the patient.
They were located in the hospital for analysis.
Additional information was gathered to reconstruct the
scenario, including the patient chart documentation, clini-
cian interviews, and the drug order entry system to cross-
reference ordered drugs for the patient.
Data Analysis and Inspection
Equipment Check Out
All identified equipment was located, and BME completed
a manufacturer’s check out and performance verification
on the PCUs and modules in question using the company’s
proprietary software. Functionally, all equipment passed
and was found to operate within the manufacturer’s spec-
ifications. The PCU and two modules that were involved
with the ‘‘communication error’’ were subjected to addi-
tional investigation.
Inspection of the Pump and Module Inter-Unit
Interface
There are connectors on either side of the PCU and mod-
ules called the inter-unit interface (IUI). When a module is
mated with a PCU, the IUI pins mesh and facilitate power
and the transfer of data between the components. An
inspection of the dopamine module and its associated PCU
revealed small pieces of ‘‘fluff’’ and green corrosion on the
contact surfaces (Fig. 1).
Data Analysis and Swimlane Diagram
Raw data were obtained from the PCU event logs and CQI
data from the support server. CQI data provided partial
drug and infusion device serial number information. The
drug order entry system provided a list of ordered drugs for
















Fig. 1 Connections 1 and 2
surface contamination with
corrosion and ‘‘fluff’’
Difficulty Using Smart Pump Logs to Recreate a Patient Safety Event Page 3 of 7 3
data to help understand the drugs being infused. Iteratively,
each interrogated PCU provided information that the
investigation team then manually plotted in a swimlane
diagram, with PCU and module details on the y-axis and
time on the x-axis (Fig. 2), to provide a visual represen-
tation of the minutes surrounding the communication error.
While the swimlane diagram has not been fully detailed,
the authors believe this concept is a useful tool in the
analysis of events.
Discussion
This patient safety issue manifested because a communi-
cation error occurred on a module infusing inotropes,
yielding an unconventional nursing response, ultimately
resulting in a decrease in the patient’s blood pressure. The
issue may not have been reported had it occurred on a
module infusing a non-critical drug.
Green corrosion on the IUI connectors is believed to be
a latent condition. Although a compliant 70 % isopropyl
alcohol (IPA) disposable wipe was used routinely to clean
the pump exterior, these wipes are not indicated to clean
the IUI contacts [14]. The ‘‘fluff’’ from the disposable wipe
snagged on the contacts and the corrosion is because the
contacts were not cleaned with the IPA solution and brush
[14]. Upon being advised of the event, the manufacturer
reiterated the IUI cleaning protocol, which the facility
promptly implemented.
The dirty contacts on the IUI connectors between the
PCU and the modules caused the alarm message ‘‘com-
munication error’’ to appear on the PCU display. Resolu-
tion of the error was not intuitive, and the pump gave no
explicit instructions, thus it was unclear to the nurse how to
resolve the issue. After the event, the manufacturer clari-
fied that ‘‘communication error’’ means that the module has
lost communication with the PCU device and that the
pump’s fail-safe mechanism is designed to continue to
infuse the drug at the prescribed rate. As this was the first
time this error had been encountered at the facility, a
practice alert to clarify ‘‘communication error’’ protocol
was drafted and circulated.
Event log and CQI data for IV pumps and related modules
PCU Event Log SEQ 04114124164175116143887808818878876910016001071170219021012141215121612171218921143164317941#











































































































































































DRUGS DOPamine 400mg/250mL -->| DOPamine 400mg/250mL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -> NORepi 16mg/250mL->| DOPamine 800mg/250mL  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
KVO STOP *         * * * *    *    *    *
 Module 13334633 192
cqi 13334633 no CQI data








DRUGS morphine 100mg/100mL @1mg/hr - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Module 13331624
cqi 13331624 no CQI data





















DRUGS ?- - -> midazolam 100/100 - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -




PCU Event Log Date/Time July 12 
7:25am to 
9:56am















?- - ->metoclopramide / IV ﬂuid - - ->?
Module 13330416
















DRUGS 2:12pm EPInephrine 5mg/250mL - >|?
CQI legend Abbreviaons
cdam (nn) connuous dose above maximum (nn = dose) cqi data extracted from connuous quality improvement reports
vtbi mismatch vtbi does not match volume of intermient dose elog data extracted from infusion module event logs
check IV CPUCPtes -Unit of infusion pump
KCL int potassium chloride intermient dose order
NORepi NORepinephrine connuous infusion

























Fig. 2 Excerpt from swimlane diagram illustrating the patient’s PC units, modules, and associated drugs and fluids
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The authors agree with Bitan and Nunnally [11] that
infusion pump logs are not designed with forethought as to
how they will be used to support an incident investigation.
Methods to view pump logs are cumbersome, and often the
extracted data are heavily coded and not easily interpreted
in plain English (Table 2). Vendor software lacks mean-
ingful tools to easily manipulate the data for analysis, such
as a swimlane diagram, leaving the investigator to compile
and interpret data from multiple sources, such as event logs
and server CQI data, to reconstruct what happened during a
clinical scenario (Fig. 3).
For this pump manufacturer, the server only captures
exceptions in the drug library at the bedside; all the
remaining drug information from the pump is stored in the
onboard memory. Cauchi et al. [15] suggest expanding the
capability of pump logs to hold at least 6 months of data.
The authors believe that all event log data should be sent
from the PCU to the CQI database. This would enable a
comprehensive understanding of how the pump is being
used without needing to access the pump directly; it would
also ensure that pump log information is centralized for
incident investigations. This convenience would eliminate
the challenge of locating pumps in a facility following an
incident as well as the need for manual log downloads
from the pumps themselves, which would outweigh the
cost of virtual hard-drive space and the additional traffic
required on the wireless infrastructure to transfer more
data.
Additional Considerations for Pump Enhancements
Modern smart pump technology does not operate as a
patient-focused system. Instead, each pump operates
independently, lacking the ability to allow soft warning or
hard stops for a combination of contraindicated drugs in the
drug library that are infusing on separate channels of a
PCU. Similarly, if two or more PCUs are concurrently
infusing drugs to the same patient, the PCUs do not cross-
reference what is being infused on the other PCU channels.
In a critical care environment, it is not uncommon for a
patient to be receiving a combination of 8–12 drugs or
fluids at one time, requiring multiple PCUs to be connected
to one patient. This situation does not allow a pharmacist to
provide hard stops in the drug library for additive
(1 ? 1 = 2), potentiation (1 ? 1 = 4), and antagonistic
(1 ? 1 = 0.5) drugs, or a combination of contraindicated
drugs that are infusing on separate channels of a PCU.
Pumps should be able to be daisy chained together so they
can communicate and record information as a cohesive
system per patient.
An ICU in Salt Lake City, Utah, USA self-developed
and implemented ‘‘smart system’’ software that interfaces a
non-smart infusion pump with patient data in the electronic
medical record. This system provided the ability to check
for concurrent drugs such as insulin and total parenteral
nutrition (TPN) infusing on different pumps. If TPN is
turned off and insulin continues infusing, an alert notifies
Table 2 Example of coded log file from pump
Description Details Company explanation in plain
language
1 AVA_EVENT_PCU SourceType = NETWORK_MANAGEMENT;
SourceContext = 0;
EventType = NET_UNIT_DISCONNECTED
A ‘‘Channel Disconnect’’ error event
has occurred
2 FORM_REQUEST Form = CHANNELS_DISCONNECTED;
FormRequest = FORM_REQUEST
The form display for such an event is
displayed ‘‘Channel Disconnected
Channel(s) have either been
disconnected while in operation or
have a non-recoverable error Press
Confirm’’ with a displayed
CONFIRM over soft key 14
3 FORM_REQUEST Form = CHANNELS_DISCONNECTED;
FormRequest = CANCEL_FORM
User selected the confirm key on the
PCU
4 RDS_CONNECTION_LOST PCU lost communication with the
server
5 RDS_CONNECTION_ESTABLISHED PCU re-established communication
with the server
6 EXTERNAL_CONTROL_EVENT EventID = RPT_LOG_REQUEST_HIST_START PCU uploading information to server
7 EXTERNAL_CONTROL_EVENT EventID = RPT_LOG_REQUEST_HIST_COMPLETED Uploaded information to server
completed
8 EXTERNAL_CONTROL_EVENT EventID = CQI_LOG_DOWNLOAD_REQUEST CQI information uploaded to server
9 EXTERNAL_CONTROL_EVENT EventID = CQI_LOG_DOWNLOAD_COMPLETED CQI uploaded information
completed
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clinicians of the inconsistency [16]. To the authors’
knowledge, no pump manufacturers currently provide this
functionality on a per-patient basis.
Conclusions
A previously known patient was admitted to the ICU with
gastrointestinal bleeding and an MI and was stabilized. One
of the patient’s pumps, infusing dopamine, displayed
‘‘communication error’’ on the PCU display. Resolution was
not intuitive, and the pump lacked clear instructions as to
how to resolve the issue in the moment. The nurse discon-
nected the module to reprogram the pump, causing an
interruption in the inotrope infusion, and subsequently the
patient’s blood pressure decreased. It was concluded that the
dirty contacts on the IUI connectors between the PCU and the
modules caused the ‘‘communication error’’. It was discov-
ered that an oversight in cleaning technique caused this
precipitous event. Learning yielded a nursing practice alert to
clarify how a nurse should resolve a ‘‘communication error’’,
and appropriate cleaning protocols were promptly imple-
mented. The investigation found that smart pump event logs
and proprietary software are not designed with any fore-
thought as to retrospective reconstruction of incident inves-
tigations, leaving facilities to cobble together pieces of
information to elucidate the patient safety event. The authors
suggest further pump enhancements, challenging pump
manufacturers to go to the next level of integration and
enable greater patient safety with smart infusion pumps.
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